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Abstract
Nigeria’s last census was in 2006. If the decennial rule is followed, the country is barely three years away 
from another headcount. In this paper, we examine the technical and political aspects of that census in order 
to derive lessons for subsequent censuses. The focus is not on the census results but rather on the processes 
leading up to and including the actual enumeration. We describe the connections between population size, 
revenue allocation and political representation as a means of understanding the social and political dynamics 
that could undermine the execution of a technically adequate census. These connections are examined 
through reference to logistic, recruitment and enumeration procedures of the 2006 Nigerian Census. We 
argue that, like most post-independence Censuses before it, there were motivation and opportunities for 
manipulating the Census figures. These parameters have not changed.
Keywords: Census; political interference; ethnicity; technical aspects; comptroller.
Résumé
Le dernier recensement du Nigeria date de 2006 et théoriquement le pays est a trois ans a peine du prochain 
dénombrement. Nous examinons ici les aspects techniques et politiques du dernier recensement afin de tirer 
des leçons pour le futur. Notre objectif n’est pas de discuter le résultat lui même, mais plutôt de regarder le 
processus de préparation aboutissant au dénombrement. Nous décrivons les relations entre taille de popula-
tion, allocation des revenues et représentation politique comme moyen de comprendre les dynamiques 
sociaux et politiques qui peuvent compromettre l’exécution d’un recensement techniquement adéquat. En 
regardant la logistique, le recrutement du personnel et les procédures de collecte, nous constatons que, 
comme pour plusieurs recensements précédents, il y avait motivation et opportunités pour la manipulation 
de celui-ci. Ces paramètres restent encore d’actualité.
Mot-clés: Recensement; interférence politique; ethnicité; aspects techniques; contrôleur.
Introduction
A census is a technical means of collecting data on 
basic social, economic and demographic characteris-
tics of a population. It is a complex and costly exer-
cise implemented on behalf of government by 
specified agencies and a host of collaborating part-
ners. The effort required to organize and implement 
it is justified because evidence-based planning for 
development purposes is possible only where there 
is dependable information on relevant population 
attributes. 
The Nigerian Census is a tense political activity. 
The perceived constitutional connections among 
population size revenue allocation and constituency 
delineation have been the main cause of inter-ethnic 
friction in the five censuses taken in the country 
since Independence in 1960 and prior to the 2006 
census. Two of these censuses – 1962 and 1973 – 
were cancelled outright. The 1991 census was con-
ducted as part of the political transition from military 
to civilian government. The 15 years between that 
Census and the 2006 National Population and Hous-
ing Census can be traced to the reluctance of 
national governments to wade into the troubled 
waters of the Nigerian Census. The country’s his-
tory of post-colonial census-taking is complicated by 
the need to mobilize an estimated 389 ethnic groups 
(Otite, 2000: vii; 30; 38ff), 36 states and the Federal 
Capital Territory (FCT) and 774 local government 
areas (LGAs) for the exercise. 
In this paper, we examine technical and political 
aspects of the 2006 Nigerian Population and Housing 
Census – that is, the processes leading up to and 
including the actual enumeration – with a view to 
uncovering the perceived connections between pop-
ulation size, revenue allocation and political repre-
sentation, which undermined the execution of an 
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adequately designed census. We do this from the 
vantage point of roles in the European Union (EU) 
External Monitoring Mission as Zonal Team Leader 
(Obono) and National Team Leader, 2004-2007 
(Omoluabi). The paper draws from our acquaint-
ance with the demarcation, logistic, recruitment, 
enumeration, and other processes of that Census. 
Methodologically, we had full access to various 
preparatory and planning documents1, interviewed 
major stakeholders, including key staff of core 
departments of the National Population Commission 
(NPC), external technical support staff, major sub-
contractors and development partners involved in 
the census process like UNFPA, UNDP and DFID. 
We assessed cartography data and enumeration data 
from the pre-test and Trial Census. As far as we 
know, this comprehensive information has not been 
made available to the scientific community by key 
participants in that exercise before now. We argue 
that, like all post-Independence Censuses, there 
were motivation for over-count and opportunities 
for manipulating the census figures in 2006 and that 
this can be averted in subsequent censuses through a 
redefinition of the NPC board, better financial and 
technical preparation and stronger institutional con-
trol and supervision at local government/Comptrol-
ler levels. 
Background to the 2006 Census
The first population head count in Nigeria was taken 
in the Lagos area by an American sailor, Captain W. 
Adams, in 1789, which put the population at 5,000. 
Other counts of Lagos took place in 1815, 1855, 
1861, 1866, 1868, and 1871. Thereafter, censuses 
were taken on a decennial basis up to 1931 but the 
first outside Lagos was in 1911 – three years to the 
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Colo-
nial Protectorates in 1914. House-to-house enumer-
ation was limited to the main ports and only rough 
estimates were made of the rest of the territories. 
According to Aluko (1965: 373), “[the Northern 
Nigerian] estimates were made on only a sheet of 
paper and despatched to the Colonial Office” 
(Aluko, 1965: 373). 
The 1931 Census was the first to be centrally 
planned and coordinated. It was affected by a locust 
invasion in the Northern Region. The 1931 round 
was affected in the East by spill-over tensions from 
the Tax Riots of 1929. The enumeration was incom-
plete. There was no Census in 1941 because of the 
Second World War (1939-1945). 
The 1951-1953 Census helped shape the politi-
cal character of all subsequent Nigerian Censuses. It 
reported the total population as 30.4 million with 
Northern Nigeria constituting 54 percent of the 
country’s population. These figures were used by 
the colonial authorities as the basis for allocating 
regional seats in the 1954 parliamentary elections 
and the 1959 general elections. They marked the 
beginning of the politicization of census figures by 
various ethnic interests. 
The preliminary results of the 1962 Census put 
the national population at 45 million with northern 
Nigeria totalling 22 million while southern Nigeria 
had a population of 23 million. They were rejected 
by Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa 
(1912-1966) amid widespread accusations of infla-
tion of census figures both in Eastern and Western 
Nigeria (Diamond, 1988). A Central Census Board 
was established to replace the Regional Census 
Boards. It conducted the 1963 Census, which placed 
the national population at 60.5 million and stated 
that the northern states had been undercounted in 
1962. The figure was “adjusted” to 55.6 million, with 
the Northern region having 29.8 million and the 
South 25.8 million. This redistribution left the previ-
ous legislative apportionment intact (Ekanem, 1972). 
The reputation of the Nigerian Census as a flash-
point of political controversy was consolidated in 
these years.
As part of the transition to civil rule, a Census 
was conducted in 1973. The provisional figures 
showed that the Northern states accounted for 64.4 
percent of the total population (51.4 million out of a 
total count of 79.8 million people). This resurrected 
old fears of regional domination. The results were 
cancelled in 1975 by the administration of General 
Murtala Muhammed (1938-1976), which had come 
to power through a military coup that year. There 
was no Census until 1991. 
Thus, the history of Nigerian Censuses has been 
the history of political controversy and mutual ethnic 
mistrust. It is against this background that an assess-
ment of the technical and political aspects of the 
country’s most recent census is important for the 
lessons it holds for the next census and overall devel-
opment planning in Africa’s largest democracy. 
The development context of the 2006 
Census
The Obasanjo years were characterized by major 
political and development reforms in Nigeria. In 
2003, the administration privatized the country’s 
four oil refineries, and instituted the National Eco-
nomic Empowerment Development Strategy 
(NEEDS), a domestically designed Poverty Reduc-
tion and Growth Strategy for fiscal and monetary 
management. Years of military dictatorship and pre-
1.  Most of these documents are not in the public domain and can therefore not be quoted here.
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vious civilian rule had failed to diversify the economy 
away from its over-dependence on the capital-inten-
sive oil sector, which provided 20 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), 95 percent of foreign 
exchange earnings, and about 65 percent of budget-
ary revenues. The subsistence agricultural sector did 
not keep pace with accelerated population growth 
and this gave rise to the food importation culture 
that is a main expression of Nigeria’s current food 
insecurity. 
From 2004, the government instituted market-
oriented reforms. It modernized the banking sector, 
curbed inflation, and resolved regional disputes over 
distribution of earnings from the oil industry. GDP 
rose strongly in 2005, based largely on increased oil 
exports and high global crude prices. In November 
2005, Abuja won Paris Club approval for a historic 
debt relief deal that, by April 2006, eliminated 25 bil-
lion of Nigeria’s total 30 billion euros of external 
debt. These reforms were instrumental to the 
return of investor and donor confidence in Nigeria. 
Multilateral support for the Census was an expres-
sion of this renewed optimism but it was also based 
on perceptions of the Census as playing an impor-
tant role in promoting democracy. As such, support 
for Census 2006 strengthened global interest in 
good governance with particular reference to the 
eighth millennium development goal (MDG) of 
developing a global partnership for development. 
Technical aspects of Census 2006
The main strengths of the 2006 Nigerian Population 
and Housing Census included adequate planning, 
funding and technical support for its implementation 
as well as the supply of scientific expertise, including 
comprehensive independent monitoring of the Cen-
sus processes by an External Monitoring Mission 
constituted by the European Union. It had the addi-
tional advantage of substantial publicity of the event 
and massive stakeholder support and public enthusi-
asm. 
In order to mobilize financial and technical 
resources for the census, the NPC, in collaboration 
with UNFPA, organized a donors’ conference. The 
Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), the EU, the 
Department for International Development (DFID), 
the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and other development partners made 
commitments to assist the Census in various ways. 
The EU made the largest external contribution in 
support of the Census to the tune of 116.3 million 
euros. The Nigerian Government allocated to the 
Census the equivalent of approximately 118 million 
euros in capital expenditure. It paid the salaries and 
allowances of over 6,000 National Population Com-
mission (NPC) regular staff and bore the costs of 
running all NPC offices – i.e. NPC Headquarters, 37 
state offices, and 774 LGA offices. DFID committed 
assistance in the area of satellite imagery, mapping 
hardware and software and technical assistance in 
cartography to the tune of 10 million pounds. UNDP 
not only implemented the major component of the 
EU Census support, it also provided financial and 
technical assistance of 3.1 million euros to the Cen-
sus project2. Indirect support was received from 
government agencies like the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC), which provided over 
160 vehicles, National Postal Services which pro-
vided storage containers, the Police and National 
and State Security Services. Logistic and financial 
support to NPC and its functionaries was provided 
by all state and LG authorities. 
The EU, which was aligned with the National 
Census Plan, covered: payment of local costs for 
training and fieldwork for Trial Census, Census and 
Post Enumeration Survey (PES); procurement of 
machine-readable questionnaires and data capturing 
and processing technology; training and capacity 
building for National Population Commission staff to 
undertake the Public Perception Study; support for 
transparency and accountability measures Funding of 
national Civil Society Organizations for monitoring 
of the Census; funding of External Monitoring Mis-
sions; and EU Visibility activities and other technical 
assistance. Payment of allowances to 780,000 ad hoc 
personnel spread over the entire country was imple-
mented by UNDP. 
With regard to the organizational framework of 
the Census, preparations began in 1999 with the re-
deployment of technical staff to the then NPC office 
in Lagos to prepare for a census proposed for 2001 
under the UNFPA Chief Technical Advisor, and the 
former military board of the NPC. The draft census 
project strategy document was developed in 
December 1999 by NPC staff with support from 
UNFPA. Even after the military board was dissolved 
and before the new civilian appointed board was 
constituted in 2002, preparations continued under 
technical direction of then Director General. Several 
missions from the UNFPA Country Support Team 
(CST) from Addis Ababa assisted to develop the 
draft consistency checks and edit specifications, pub-
licity and advocacy strategy, methodology for census 
mapping, and data processing strategy.
Nevertheless, there was insufficient political will 
for a census in 2001. In 2003, the Obasanjo regime 
decided to fully support the census rescheduled for 
20053. Activities picked up with internal and external 
2.  Newsletter of the United Nations Development Programme in Nigeria, Special Edition, April 2006.
 African Population Studies Vol  27, 2 Supp (Mar 2014)
http://aps.journals.ac.za 252
funding. Consultations intensified with census 
experts, civil society organisations (CSOs), commu-
nity-based groups, political leaders, policy makers, 
researchers and the general public. United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA) and EU missions were 
invited to scrutinize the Census plans and provide 
input in the revision of the Strategy Document 
developed by NPC staff (Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, National Population Commission, 2005) . 
UNFPA continued to provide the Census Chief 
Technical Advisor (CTA) while the EU recruited 
Advisors on Census publicity, information Technol-
ogy (IT) and Census cartography. DFID recruited an 
Advisor on OMR/OCR technology. The EU also 
instituted a series of monitoring missions to enhance 
the management and implementation of the Census 
at specific milestones of the Census, including Base-
line (before the agreement to support the project); 
Enumeration Area Demarcation; Pre-test and Trial 
Census; final preparations; census exercise; Post 
Enumeration Survey; data processing; and dissemi-
nation and publication of Census results.
The Census Technical Group (headed by the 
NPC Director General) and the Action Plan Com-
mittee (headed by the CTA) were established to 
guide the process. Due to the socio-political chal-
lenges historically attached to the Census process in 
Nigeria, there was need for an effective nationwide 
communication strategy to educate citizens about 
the purposes and value of the Census, as well as pro-
vide advocacy to specific groups who might be wary 
of the exercise. The National Publicity Committee 
was launched, followed by its State Publicity Com-
mittees in mid-2004 in all 36 states and the FCT. 
Members were drawn from public and private sec-
tors and included members of the National Orienta-
tion Agency, National Union of Journalists and 
Teachers, the National Council of Women’s Socie-
ties, the News Agency of Nigeria, the National Tele-
vision Authority, and the Federal Radio Corporation 
of Nigeria.
At the grass-roots level, LGA Publicity Commit-
tees were inaugurated by the Federal Commission-
ers in October-December 2004. The LGA 
committee had the LGA Chair as its committee 
chairman and the NPC Comptroller as secretary. Its 
membership included the Divisional Police Officer 
(DPO) and a representative of the Traditional Rulers’ 
Council. The committees were equipped with pub-
licity materials and held seminars and rallies in sena-
torial constituencies. Local town criers were used to 
carry Census messages while market rallies were 
conducted to present the 2006 Census to market 
traders and the public.
The use of the GSM cellular telephone network 
was an innovation of Census 2006. The three major 
GSM operators in the country at the time dissemi-
nated Census text messages to the general public at 
regular intervals close to Census date. NPC Head-
quarters and State offices all had GSM hotlines which 
were available to the public for information and ena-
bled people to report where enumeration had not 
been done in order to ensure maximum coverage.
Census messages were designed in English and 
translated into Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, Ibibio, Efik, and 
pidgin. They highlighted the importance of being 
counted, offences related to the Census exercise, 
sample questions to be asked during enumeration, 
appeals against migration, and explanation that Cen-
sus was not a tool for taxation. These messages 
were disseminated via television, radio, posters, leaf-
lets, billboards, newspaper adverts, and interper-
sonal media. 
In the weeks approaching 21 March 2006 (when 
actual count was scheduled to start), mass media 
coverage of the Census increased. Newspapers car-
ried a corner counting down the number of days to 
the Census date, and ran polls to assess general 
awareness about the Census. Once the actual count 
started in the field, articles and stories about the 
Census shifted to operational problems of the exer-
cise. Although there was resistance from some sec-
tional interest groups in the Niger Delta and parts of 
the South East, who used the Census as a platform 
for highlighting pre-existing ethnic agendas, on the 
whole the nationwide communication and advocacy 
campaign by NPC was effective. Ninety percent of 
Nigerians polled by The Guardian were aware of the 
Census and 91 percent appreciated that Census tak-
ing was vital to national development. 
Census organizational structure
Overall responsibility for planning, preparation, 
implementation, coordination, monitoring and evalu-
ation of the Census rested with the NPC Headquar-
ters. State offices of the NPC were responsible for 
State-level Census activities. The Federal Commis-
sioner in the State and the State Director were in 
charge of administrative and technical issues. Local 
Government Area (LGA) offices were responsible 
for all Census activities at LGA level. They provided 
Census materials to Census functionaries in the field 
and retrieved them after the enumeration. An LGA 
office was headed by a Comptroller who reported 
to a State Director and the Federal Commissioner of 
the State. Census field functionaries included Coor-
dinators who led teams of about four Supervisors 
during fieldwork. Coordinators reported daily to 
3.  It was again postponed for six months to 2006 to allow for better preparations.
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their LGA Comptroller4. Supervisors were responsi-
ble for five teams of enumerators (i.e. Census imple-
mentation in at least five Enumeration Areas). They 
ensured the smooth progress of enumeration. They 
established good working contact with the Police, 
civil and village heads, and other authorities. Supervi-
sors carried out control visits in each EA, to check 
questionnaires for completeness and accuracy, to 
ensure that Enumerators visited all dwellings in their 
EA and to sort out all emerging problems. They 
remained in close touch with their Coordinators 
during the field work period5. 
The Enumerators were key functionaries on 
whom depended the reliability of the Census data 
because they were the ones actually conducting the 
enumeration. Each team of enumerators comprised 
two people (usually one female and one male) and 
were supposed to have one EA assigned to it6. Their 
main field tasks were to check their EA maps to 
ensure that their boundaries were discrete. They 
also conducted house numbering and household-list-
ing and updated the previous listing information 
where necessary. During enumeration, Enumeration 
Teams (ETs) completed all Census documentation on 
all households in their EA and within households 
they covered all household members. The com-
pleted documents were then submitted to Supervi-
sors for checking and editing. 
Cross posting of key staff and field 
functionaries 
Cross-posting of key Census staff was done in order 
to reduce the risk of Census manipulation from NPC 
staff7. Senior management of NPC had been aware 
that if political manipulation of the Census figures 
occurred, it would be with the collusion of NPC reg-
ular staff, or some key fieldwork staff like Supervi-
sors. It took steps to cross-post these functionaries 
at five levels, viz. Federal Commissioners; State 
Directors; Heads of Data Processing Centres; 
Comptrollers (transferred to different LGAs within 
the same States); and Supervisors. Apart from the 
Comptrollers, all these functionaries worked not 
only outside their usual states of work, but also out-
side their states of origin. The Federal Commission-
ers remained in their States of origin to ensure the 
recruitment of Census functionaries and the compi-
lation of the final “frozen” list of functionaries before 
moving to their cross-posted state to supervise the 
rest of the census preparations. They were finally 
cross-posted in December 2005 and most resumed 
at their cross-posted state only in January 2006, 
barely two months before the Census.
Comptrollers were cross-posted from their 
usual LGAs office to another LGA in the same state. 
The move may have weakened the connection 
between them and the local authorities but, again, it 
occurred late into the process. Many Comptrollers 
did not have time to get acquainted with the geogra-
phy or politics of their new LGA as they arrived only 
a few weeks before the Census. Funding for trans-
portation of Census functionaries and materials did 
not arrive from Headquarters at the beginning of the 
Census when it was most needed. Consequently, 
Comptrollers relied on Local Government Area 
Chairmen and other local leaders to fund some 
aspects of their logistics. In our view, cross-posting 
should always be accompanied by financial auton-
omy and institutional guarantees of transparency and 
accountability to reduce the risk of staff interference 
with census processes. 
The census instruments and census 
tests
The 2006 Nigerian Population and Housing Census, 
which took place from 21-27 March, obtained infor-
mation on the total number of persons in Nigeria, 
age/sex and occupational distribution of the popula-
tion, its levels of literacy, employment and unem-
ployment, as well as the current stock and condition 
of housing, access to water, electricity and other 
social amenities. Its methodology, instruments and 
logistics were pre-tested prior to enumeration. A 
pre-test in April 2005 revealed weaknesses in prepa-
ration. Recommendations for improvements were 
addressed in the weeks that followed but the Trial 
Census (29 August-2 September 2005) based on a 5 
percent sample of Supervisory Areas (SAs) showed 
serious logistical and management flaws. The Census 
was rescheduled from the widely advertised 
November 2005 to March 2006 to allow for 
improved preparations.
Census 2006 was an innovation in the history of 
Nigerian Census data collection and analysis. In addi-
tion to being the first housing census in Nigeria, it 
adopted the Optical Mark Reader (OMR) and Opti-
cal Character Recognition (OCR) method in the 
questionnaires. The information collected in the 
4.  National Population Commission Census Coordinators’ Manual.
5.  National Population Commission Field Supervisors’ Manual.
6.  Because cartography staff had carved out too many EAs during demarcation, enumerators were actually given more 
than one EA to canvass during the actual census, making verification and control difficult.
7.  Cross posting was also done in some earlier censuses that have been contested; therefore, it is not clear how effective 
this has been in reducing political influence on the census.
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OMR/OCR questionnaires was meant to be scanned 
electronically instead of being captured manually. 
The main Census instruments produced were 
NPC01 forms, used for the enumeration of all per-
sons and households; NPC02 forms, used in the Post 
Enumeration Survey (PES) for all persons and house-
holds as above; NPC06 forms, used for the summary 
of data collected; and NPC07 (original and duplicate) 
and NPC07M forms, used for house numbering and 
household listing. Other instruments produced by 
NPC and used for the conduct of the Census 
included Enumerators’ manual; Supervisors’ manual; 
Coordinators’ Training Manual; Enumeration Area 
(EA) Maps; Call back card (NPC05); Transmittal 
form (NPC09 A-D); Oath of secrecy form; List of 
historical events for each of the 774 LGAs or dis-
tricts; and List of occupation codes.
Nigeria opted for OMR/OCR questionnaires in 
Census 2006, not only to reduce errors and data 
processing time, but also as a way of reducing fraud 
by making it more difficult and, if it occurred, easier 
to detect. The forms and scanning technology were 
imported from overseas to guard against falsification 
(within Nigeria) and other manipulations of the 
instrument even before it went to the field. A Ger-
man company was selected by open tender to sup-
ply the scanners for scanning the Census forms and a 
UK company was selected to print and deliver the 
OMR/OCR Census forms. 
The questionnaires were state coded, except for 
the central reserve of 5 percent that could be dis-
patched to any state in an emergency. Each ques-
tionnaire had a unique number and barcode and 
specific colour density recognizable only by the Cen-
sus scanners installed at the Data Processing Cen-
tres. Consequently, photocopied forms, even very 
good quality identical colour photocopies, could be 
easily recognized and rejected by the scanners, not 
only because of the repetition of the unique number 
and barcode, but also because of a different density 
of colour that was invisible to the human eye.
To facilitate scanning, the NPC01 form was 
designed to enable pre-coded responses that could 
be shaded in small boxes as in a lotto ticket. This 
gave a dense appearance to the questionnaire, which 
was unfriendly to the human eye. This may have 
inhibited the checking and spotting of errors during 
the implementation of the questionnaire in the field. 
Errors in handwritten responses and codes were 
easier to spot than errors in the shaded boxes mainly 
because of the small size of the shaded boxes.
Questionnaire length and content
Since the NPC01 form only contained basic demo-
graphic, socio-economic and housing characteristics, 
the length of the questionnaire was modest in com-
parison with Census questionnaires in other Cen-
suses (for example South Africa and Lesotho). The 
NPC01 form did not have questions on fertility and 
mortality. These were transferred to the PES ques-
tionnaire. Our observation is that a short question-
naire is less likely to fatigue the interviewer and 
interviewee. Accordingly, NPC01 could have been 
less prone to error than lengthier instruments. 
Although the wording of the questions in the 
NPC01 form was in line with standard Census ques-
tions, there were a few design flaws. In some cases, 
the categories of answers provided were all inclu-
sive. For example, in Q11 (Previous Residence), 
those who had not moved could not be correctly 
recorded because a “Not Applicable” category was 
not included in the design of that question. In Q18 
(Occupation), it was difficult to distinguish between 
“Non-response” and “Not Applicable” whenever 
that column was left blank. This had implications for 
the accurate processing and analysis of the Census 
information.
Contradictions of a de facto Census
Most African countries undertake a de jure Census – 
one which enumerated the usual residents of a 
household. Owing to Nigeria’s Anglophone colonial 
census legacy, the sensitive nature of Nigerian Cen-
suses (to which we have drawn attention earlier in 
this paper), and particularly because of the risk of 
over-count, the enumeration procedure for Census 
2006 was the de facto method – which enumerates 
persons physically found present in an area on Cen-
sus night. In Census 2006, every household member 
was enumerated on a face-to-face basis. Adults were 
allowed to provide information for younger house-
hold members provided these persons were physi-
cally present during the enumeration. Thumbprints 
of each enumerated person were taken.
Absentee heads of households and 
other issues
Errors emerged from listing “Absentee” heads of 
households (HHHs), who were the focal persons in 
NPC01. Next to every person’s name and sex, an 
Enumerator was required to record his/her “rela-
tionship to the Head of Household”. The codes for 
this “relationship” included Head of household (only 
one can exist in a household); Absentee head of 
household; Spouse; Child; Parent; and Other rela-
tive. The HHH was usually the first person to be 
enumerated and received the entry code number 
001. In principle, this person was an adult: male or 
female. All other members of the household were 
listed after the head as 002, 003, etc. Unlike most 
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other Census questionnaires, the Nigerian Census 
form made provision for listing and enumerating an 
unseen “Absentee Head of Household” despite the 
overall de facto character of the Census design. 
The code “Absentee Head of Household” was a 
potential source of double count at the analysis 
stage. The absentee head could be captured as a 
“ghost” HHH at another household where he did 
not spend Census Night. A polygynous man married 
to three wives in different localities, and who spent 
Census night with only one of them, would be iden-
tified with a name and a number, enumerated and 
have his fingerprints taken once in that household. 
However, the same person would be identified as 
“absentee head of household” twice in the house-
holds of his other wives or concubines, with his 
name and a number. He would then be counted 
among the total number of persons in these two 
other households although there would be no finger-
prints for him. Now, total persons in a household 
was recorded on the first page of the household 
form NPC01 and on form NPC06, which summa-
rised this for the entire EA. Analyzing the summary 
data presented on the Census forms without 
deducting these “ghost household heads” could lead 
to over-count of polygynous Nigerian males. This 
may not have been the intention of the designers of 
the questionnaire, but it was a direct consequence of 
the inclusion of that category. Because the designers 
did not specify in the question on marital status 
whether each married person was in a monogamous 
or polygamous relationship, it was not possible to 
obtain information on nuptiality dynamics through 
this quicker way or to deduct multiple polygynous 
HHH counts. Correspondingly, the “Absentee head 
of household” phenomenon grossly underestimated 
the percentage of female headed households and, 
since “Absentee head of household” is not a standard 
classification, reduced comparability of Nigerian 
Census data with data from other countries.
Beyond these potential sources of errors, when-
ever “absentee head of household” was identified by 
question N° 3, Enumerators were instructed not to 
ask the remaining questions N° 4-19 because the 
person was not present on Census night. But this 
instruction was not specified on the questionnaire as 
a skip pattern and, so, was often not implemented 
by fieldworkers. Review of the Trial Census data by 
the authors indicated that Enumerators did not heed 
the instruction not to fill in other information (name, 
age, sex, nationality, origin, place of usual residence, 
etc.) for the absentee head of household. Many Enu-
merators went ahead to fill in these data for someone 
they did not see. In theory, the edit specifications for 
processing the Census data could be designed in 
such a way that as soon as a person was identified as 
an absentee head, then all of the “extra data” would 
be deleted so as not to count an unseen person in a 
de facto Census.8
Even if the Enumerator had indeed heeded the 
instruction and did not collect supplementary infor-
mation on the “absentee head of household”, the 
lack of information in questions N° 4-19 for this vital 
focal person around which the relationship of the 
entire household members was statistically and soci-
ologically constructed weakened the whole edifice 
of relationships, making it impossible to validate data 
on other household members linked to him, as there 
was no reference data on “absentee head of house-
hold” for comparison. For example, if an edit check 
were to specify that the age of a child must be at 
least 15 years less than that of the HHH, this check 
cannot be undertaken with an absentee head of 
household because he would have no age data. 
The review of the Trial Census data revealed that 
that Enumerators often entered a code of 1 for head 
of household and then “automatically” coded 2 for 
“Spouse” although, in the questionnaire, “2” was the 
code for “absentee head of household” and “3” the 
code for “spouse.” Consequently, a non-negligible 
proportion of households in the Trial Census were 
recorded as having one HHH and one “absentee 
household head” at one and the same time. In most 
of such cases, it was the spouse who had been incor-
rectly coded as “absentee head of household.”
With respect to age of respondents, enumera-
tors were trained on the use of a Historical Events 
Calendar but they seldom had these issued to them. 
They were thus faced with difficulties when estimat-
ing the age of adult respondents. These difficulties 
are not unique to Nigerian censuses. In rural areas, 
where oral (as opposed to written) tradition is the 
main source of information, adults had only vague 
ideas of their age and some would often report a 
much higher or lower age than their actual age. 
Religion and Ethnicity were not captured by 
Census 2006. After heated debates in the press and 
in data users’ workshops, when the controversial 
nature of questions on ethnicity and religion became 
evident, NPC made a submission to the Federal 
Government on the merits and demerits of including 
them in the questionnaire. The National Council of 
States (comprising the President, Vice-President, 
former heads of state, governors and traditional rul-
ers) decided to remove these questions from the 
questionnaire. 
In the view of NPC Chair Samaila Danko 
Makama (2006), “The problem with Nigeria is that 
8.  The authors did not have access to the consistency checks and edit specifications used by NPC.
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we have tended to place more premium on using 
Census data for revenue allocation than on planning 
for sustainable development.” In his reasoning, since 
religious and ethnic groups would prefer numerical 
superiority over each other, it might be safer to 
ignore religion and ethnicity altogether to reduce the 
temptation for each group to explore ways of having 
a competitive edge through the census. 
Political environment of Census 2006
The political aspects of the 2006 Nigerian Population 
and Housing Census can be examined from the con-
text of constitutional provisions that contribute to a 
politicisation of the exercise. These provisions 
include the bases of political representation and rev-
enue allocation as well as the composition of the 
management board of the NPC. While it is clear that 
the intention of the formulators of the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution (and the 1979 Constitution before it) 
was not to politicise the country’s Censuses, the 
provisions invariably created both an awareness of 
the possibility of politics and conditions for the politi-
cisation of the process. 
For many Nigerian social scientists, with the 
exception of elections, “population Census has 
remained the most sensitive and controversial issue 
in the politics and administration of the Nigerian 
state” (Mbeke-Ekanem, 2006). While participating in 
the 2006 Census exercise in Kano, Governor Ibra-
him Shekarau of Kano State enjoined Nigerians to 
consider the exercise as one of the prerequisites for 
ensuring the growth of the country instead of seeing 
the head count as an opportunity to outdo one 
another over numerical strength (Guardian, 22 
March 2006: 8). 
The politicisation of the Nigerian Census is thus 
rooted in the national discourse of even develop-
ment and federal character. With regard to political 
representation, as noted, the 1953 Census estab-
lished and validated the practice of allocating seats in 
the Federal Legislature on the basis of regional pop-
ulation size. The 1954 Lyttleton Constitution allo-
cated seats in the Federal Parliament according to its 
figures. The Northern Region was allocated half of 
the seats in the House, while the other two regions 
shared the other half equally. This was the genesis of 
national Census rivalry.
The preliminary results of the first post-inde-
pendence Census were rejected by government 
without allowing the census process to reach the 
stage of checks and validation to produce the final 
results. The head of the Census Team, Mr. J. Warren, 
was fired by the Prime Minister when it recorded a 
slight numerical majority for the South. Had they not 
been rejected, the results would have required a 
reapportionment of seats in the Federal Parliament 
and entailed a strategic loss of political advantage to 
the Northern People’s Congress. 
The Prime Minister ordered a recount in 1963, 
with himself as head of the National Census Board. 
That recount put the population of Nigeria at 60.5 
million. In the new figures, the North had a popula-
tion that exceeded the South’s by 8.5 million. The 
national total appeared too high to Census officials 
and was pruned to 55.65 million, with a reduced 
numerical majority (4 million) for the North. The fig-
ures were not accepted by the Premiers of the 
Western and Eastern regions and the results of that 
Census formed part of a mounting crisis in the West-
ern Region that ultimately led to the succession of 
military coups d’état in Nigeria. Every Census since 
then has taken place in an atmosphere of deep ran-
cour among the different states and ethnic groups in 
the country. The allocation of seats in the Federal 
Parliament was the motivation for a large regional 
Census figure in the 1963 Census and this was pur-
suant to regional interest in revenue allocation. The 
struggle for allocation became a serious issue with 
the discovery of oil. The independence constitution 
favoured a 50 percent derivation formula in revenue 
allocation, while the other 50 percent went to the 
federal government. 
With the discovery of oil in the late 1950s and 
the Civil War in the 1960s, the Yakubu Gowon mili-
tary administration in 1969 gained federal control of 
oil revenue generated in the country and developed 
a revenue allocation formula that was, in addition to 
other factors, based on population size. As part of 
the transition to civil rule, Gowon called for a Cen-
sus which was organised in 1973. The massive over-
count of this Census, which, with a total population 
of 79.8 million, gave the north a numerical majority 
of 23 million, was an invitation to fresh political insta-
bility only a few years after a bitter civil war. The 
government immediately cancelled the results.
The belief that federal budgetary allocations are 
directly linked to population size promotes a strate-
gic interest in inflating figures. As a way out, Lles 
Leba (2006) proposed that the direction of revenue 
flow from the federal government to state and local 
governments be reversed such that fiscal contribu-
tions to the federal treasury by the latter two tiers of 
government are based on the respective populations 
in each area. This approach would reduce the moti-
vation to increase population figures, as a large pop-
ulation would imply an increased burden of 
expected monthly remittance by the State govern-
ment to the Federal treasury. This recommendation 
unfortunately assumes that a positive relationship 
exists between fertility-induced population size and 
productivity and that it is equitable to impose higher 
African Population Studies Vol  27, 2 Supp (Mar 2014)
http://aps.journals.ac.za 257
taxes on areas of high population. 
Arguments like this do not address the inter-eth-
nic mix of cities like Kano and Lagos, whose large 
population size is less the result of fertility increase 
than internal migration. On the cultural front, reve-
nue allocation and political representation are not 
significant drivers of fertility in comparison to histori-
cal conditions of high infertility rates, pregnancy 
wastage, infant and child mortality and the social 
expectations of families (Obono, 2001). While 
Leba’s proposal might indeed serve as a disincentive 
to Census over-count, it could just as easily lead 
instead to an undercount as shown in the colonial 
enumerations conducted before independence 
(Locoh and Omoluabi, 1995).
Composition of the NPC Management 
Board
The 1999 Nigerian Constitution (Item 8 of the 
Exclusive Legislative List) empowers the National 
Assembly to legislate exclusively on Census. Part 1 of 
the Third Schedule contains Item J paragraphs 23 
and 24, which invest the NPC with the responsibility 
of conducting periodical enumeration of population 
and prescribes its composition and powers. Section 
153 lists the National Population Commission as one 
of the Federal Executive Bodies and guarantees its 
independence and autonomy in that regard, while 
Section 158 insulates it from Executive control. Sec-
tion 213 of the Constitution describes the proce-
dures for treating the report of the NPC on Census. 
There are two principal constitutional provisions 
on the NPC, which contributed to politicising the 
2006 Census. The first is the provision that the Pop-
ulation Commission shall comprise a Chairman and 
one person from each State of the federation and 
the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja (Item J 
paragraph 23 of Part I of the Third Schedule to the 
Constitution). This provision conforms to the Fed-
eral Character requirements of Section 14 (3), but it 
also injects political factors into the composition of 
the Commission charged with conducting a scientific 
Census for the country by causing members of the 
Commission to view their membership in terms of 
political representation of their States/Regions. In a 
bid to advance diversity and inclusiveness, this Con-
stitutional provision transforms the Commission into 
a regular political board9. The Board is appointed by 
the President in consultation with the Council of 
State and confirmation by the Senate [S154 (1) (3)]. 
NPC board members are thus political appointees 
and not technocrats per se. It is notable in this regard 
that the 8-member Board of the Population Com-
mission responsible for the 1991 Census had no such 
political alliances. The seven Federal Commissioners 
and Chairman of the previous Board were appointed 
on professional merit. They were in charge of zones 
which were defined by geographic workload and not 
regional representation.
By allowing the appointment of one board mem-
ber per state, the constitutional provisions antici-
pated political interference in the Census process. In 
doing so, however, they created conditions for that 
interference even while trying to avoid it. In the next 
sections, we will examine the processes of the 2006 
Census that were the immediate contexts and entry 
points of much political influence. These include the 
enumeration area demarcation (EAD) process, staff 
recruitment, Census forms distribution, local logisti-
cal and financial support, and the enumeration itself.
Enumeration area demarcation
Nigeria has a total area of 923,768 km2 of which 
water takes up 13,000 km2. For this reason, EAD – 
which is the first major field activity in a Census – 
was an enormous challenge in the build up to Census 
2006. Its main objective was to sub-divide the coun-
try into clearly defined small geographic units known 
as Enumeration Areas (EAs) that an Enumeration 
Team (ET) was expected to cover during the Census 
period. At the end of demarcation, a list of EAs, 
called an EA frame, was produced along with the EA 
maps and EA codes, in such a way that when placed 
side by side, no land area in Nigeria overlapped or 
was omitted. A correct EA frame is the foundation 
for a Census. It facilitates efficient sharing of the enu-
merators’ workload and constitutes the frame for 
reporting the Census results at the lowest, verifiable 
level.
By May 2005, NPC’s funding was in poor shape. 
A sum of 1.3 billion naira (7.9 million Euros), which 
was outstanding from the 2004 national budget, had 
not been released10. No disbursement from the 
approved 2005 budget was released and, after 
exhausting all of its financial reserves, the Commis-
sion was slowly grinding to a halt. This situation had 
implications for the EAD in various ways. Contrac-
tors had not received any payments and had stopped 
9.  By contrast, the compositions of the Independent National Electoral Commission (Chairman and 12 others), the Federal 
Civil Service Commission (Chairman and 15 others), and the Code of Conduct Bureau (Chairman and nine others) do 
not reflect State/Regional representation in precisely the same way as the NPC board does.
10.  Cash backing had not been received for the 1.3 billion naira outstanding from the 2004 budget allocation by close of 
accounts. However, since the Due Process Certificates had been obtained, a special dispensation authorized the release 
of these funds from the 2005 budget allocation while exploring other sources for these funds.
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supplying materials for EAD and other preparations. 
The Abuja headquarters as well as all state offices 
had not received any funds for running costs for sev-
eral months. Arrears of staff allowances since 2001 
had still not been paid and the workers’ union was 
threatening a nationwide strike action for 2 June 
2005. Demarcators had not been paid from March 
to June 2005. They depended on the goodwill of 
local authorities for food, accommodation and sti-
pend. In Kano State, demarcators were accommo-
dated and provided with two meals per day by the 
Local Government. In Lagos State, they received a 
subsistence allowance. Many other State and Local 
Government Authorities provided direct and indi-
rect assistance to demarcators. Under these circum-
stances, the NPC could not reprimand its 8,200 
fieldworkers for not doing their demarcation job 
properly. 
Enumeration area demarcation in Nigeria was 
undertaken nationwide from July 2004 to November 
2005. Owing to the late arrival of funds, most of the 
demarcation work was compressed into just 10 
months (from February to November 2005) -- seven 
LGAs in Phase I (July 2004); 37 LGAs in Phase II 
(September 2004); and 730 LGAs in Phase III (Janu-
ary-November 2005). 
The External Monitoring Mission acknowledged 
the critical importance of State and Local Govern-
ment support for the continuation of the demarca-
tion exercise but warned that this brought with it a 
real risk of compromising the allegiance of demarca-
tors during EAD. This support from local authorities 
for the demarcation exercise came at the price of a 
212 percent increase in the number of EAs. The 
1991 Census EAD demarcated 212,072 EAs (NPC, 
2004: 2-3). The Census Strategy and Implementa-
tion Plan (August 2004) estimated that about 
350,000 Enumeration Areas (EAs) and 70,000 
Supervisory Areas (SAs) would be delineated during 
the EAD exercise for the 2005 Census (before it was 
postponed to March 2006). The figure of 350,000 
EAs was computed from the projected national pop-
ulation of 134 million by 2005 derived from the 1991 
Census, and the plan to demarcate EAs having from 
250-500 persons in rural areas and 400-500 persons 
in urban areas. 
While senior NPC management at Headquarters 
was aware of this strategy, State NPC offices were 
not provided with an “expected number of EAs” 
within which to base their work. They simply went 
ahead, and with the support of local political authori-
ties, demarcated areas without following guidelines 
for EAD and, more crucially, without sufficient 
supervision from Headquarters. At that time, the 
financial and logistical implications of doubling the 
number of EAs provided for in the Census Strategy 
Document were not appreciated by the Cartogra-
phy Department or by NPC management. 
A verification exercise undertaken in May 2005 
showed that many fieldworkers were over-estimat-
ing the population quick counts and producing too 
many undersized EAs, especially in political “flash-
points” like Kogi State, which had carved out an 
impressive number of EAs by overestimating popula-
tion size in the quick counts. Some local communi-
ties had confused Census EAD with electoral 
delineation. Within this setting, they reasoned that 
by carving out more EAs, they would increase the 
number of their electoral wards and their chances of 
political representation. Reinforced by a combina-
tion of poor training and lack of supervision of field-
workers, the resulting explosion of EAs was 
inevitable. 
By September 2005, about 436,367 EAs had 
been demarcated for 71 percent of LGAs. By the 
time EAD was completed, 662,180 EAs had been 
demarcated for the 2006 Census. This was three 
times the number of EAs carved out in the 1991 
Census. While NPC management was expecting a 
65 percent increase in EAs from the 1991 exercise, 
they were quite unprepared for the 212 percent 
increase in EAs that was produced for the 2006 Cen-
sus. 
The main question as census night approached 
was: Who will foot the bill for the extra EAs? The 
original strategy of one EA per Enumeration Team 
meant that 662,180 EAs would be canvassed by 
1,324,360 Enumerators, 132,436 Supervisors and 
33,109 Coordinators, making a total of almost 1.5 
million fieldworkers, an increase of 89 percent from 
the original 787,500 fieldworkers already budgeted 
for in the Census Strategy Document. 
The NPC realised that it lacked the financial and 
logistic resources to manage this number of field-
workers. “Right-sizing” became the term used to 
describe how to assign the 662,180 generally under-
sized or over-estimated EAs into contiguous units 
for the original 350,000 ETs and to ensure that an 
Enumeration Team would be allocated sufficient 
work for the Census enumeration period. This right-
sizing was undertaken from November 2005 to Feb-
ruary 2006. Although grouping 662,180 EAs 
together for 350,000 teams at such a late stage in 
the Census process was a vast and risky operation, 
the NPC succeeded with right-sizing the Enumera-
tors’ workload but at a cost for adequate retrieval of 
census control forms and maps. The lessons learned 
are clear. For such a crucial and fundamental exer-
cise as EAD, upon which the entire Census depends, 
adequate preparation, funding, implementation, 
supervision, and assurance of autonomy are needed 
in subsequent Census operations. 
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Recruitment of census functionaries
Recruitment of functionaries (Coordinators, Supervi-
sors and Enumerators) was a major weakness of the 
2006 Census. Although the EU funded the payment 
of the Census functionaries, recruitment remained 
the responsibility of NPC, which also had to certify 
functionaries before they received EU payment for 
Census work. In most developing country settings, 
teachers and other civil servants are the desired 
Census functionaries because they are well 
respected in their communities, have a reputation at 
stake and are easy to track down through govern-
ment records. The Federal Commissioners of NPC 
decided against the recruitment of teachers and civil 
servants as functionaries citing the high rate of 
unemployment among Nigerian youth and the need 
to use the Census to alleviate this11. 
Recruitment was removed from the office of the 
Federal Commissioner and implemented by the 774 
LGA Comptrollers as a means of insuring it against 
political interference. But all Comptrollers were 
under the strict supervision of Federal Commission-
ers, and the Commissioners were political appoint-
ees. In this context, employment of functionaries 
was seen by many as a way of fulfilling a major role 
expectation in their State constituencies. In the 
event, cross-posting of Federal Commissioners did 
not affect this vital aspect of the Census as all 
recruitment was completed in the States before 
Federal Commissioners were cross-posted at the 
end of December 2005. 
Lead stakeholders reportedly pressurized 
Comptrollers to accept their candidates even after 
list compilation and submission deadlines had 
passed. Enumerators were chased away from Kpam-
bai, Jenuwan Kogi, Bika, Ussa and Takum LGAs in 
Taraba State because they were not indigenes of the 
state. These LGAs complained that their people 
were not given any political appointments by the 
Government (Daily Independent, 6 April, 2006).. Offi-
cials of the NPC in Osun were assaulted in Ifetedo 
when attackers stormed the NPC office in protest 
against the non-employment of indigenes of the 
community as Census functionaries (This Day, 21 
March 2006).
Lists of successful candidates were posted at 
LGAs in the first week of March, 2006 but there 
were problems with the lists. Supervisors (who 
should have been cross-posted, i.e. undertaken Cen-
sus supervision in a state other than theirs) consti-
tuted the full membership on Supervisors’ lists. A 
memo from the authorities reaffirmed an earlier 
position on cross-posting, but it came only after pro-
tests at NPC Offices had begun to spread around 
the country. Members of the National Youth Service 
Corps (NYSC), who ought to have comprised 50 
percent of the bona fide Supervisors, made allega-
tions of serious nepotism and corruption in the 
recruitment exercise. They claimed the existence on 
the list of what they described as “Ghost Cor-
pers”12. They had no confidence in the lists. The 
development conformed with the widespread view 
that:
In Nigeria, connections confer privilege and 
impunity in a prendalist regime that is charac-
terized by patron-client relations rather than 
due process in the provision of basic services. 
[Connections] pave the way for one’s entry 
into networks of trust, a compromise that 
may occasionally shield criminal activity and 
subvert due process (Obono and Obono, 
2012: 237).
Since the Census was organized less than a year 
from scheduled national elections in 2007, recruit-
ment was possibly vulnerable to political interest. 
Politicians used the opportunity to provide tempo-
rary employment to their youth wings. The pressure 
on Comptrollers to recruit names sent to them by 
high-ranking officials and members of the political 
elite was irresistible. It was at the level of Comptrol-
ler that much of the reported and observed chal-
lenges of the recruitment and enumeration exercises 
of the census occurred. 
Funding and support from local 
authorities 
Local government authorities assisted the Census by 
making vehicles, motorbikes and guides available to 
functionaries. The Census depended heavily on this 
support because funding voted for transportation 
and other critical census activities did not arrive 
when it was most needed, especially at the beginning 
of Census. Some LGAs paid functionaries daily or 
monthly feeding and/or transport allowances – as 
had been the case during EAD. Some LGAs gave as 
much as 30,000 Naira to Supervisors and 10,000 
Naira to Enumerators per month. 
The Comptroller coordinated this process. 
While UNDP disbursed the official EU payment to 
functionaries, the Comptroller was responsible for 
paying out the sums granted by the State or Local 
Government. Because of the lack of transparency in 
11.  As political appointees of the ruling party, this choice gave Commissioners an opportunity of doing something for their 
constituencies and the connection with the LGA Chairmen then appeared “seamless”.
12.  “Ghost Corpers” was the term used by members of the NYSC to described fictitious individuals whose names appeared 
on the lists of NYSC Supervisors, although such individuals were not NYSC members.
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the disbursement from local authorities, functionar-
ies did not often know how much they were meant 
to receive or when. There were reports that some 
Comptrollers paid less than the stipulated amount of 
LGA support, while some fieldworkers said they did 
not get any payments at all. It was difficult to corrob-
orate these claims as there were no records of what 
came to be described as “hospitality packages.” The 
dependency of NPC on LGAs for “hospitality” to its 
functionaries and the freedom with which this was 
defined by the authorities posed risks to the integrity 
of Census data collection.
Indeed, the observations of the external moni-
toring mission showed that the Comptroller was the 
weakest link in the Census 2006 process. It is at this 
level that subsequent censuses could require the 
greatest inter-agency and global partnership collabo-
rations. NPC Comptrollers were at the heart of the 
distribution process at the LGA level. They were vul-
nerable to political pressure in the distribution of 
Census forms, especially from 23 March when 
“shortages” began to be reported nationwide. In this 
setting, the relationship between an LGA Chairman 
and a Comptroller was a patron-client relationship. 
According to one report,
The cross-posted National Population Commis-
sioner in charge of Sokoto State, Otunba Okanla-
won, reportedly “decried a situation where 
Comptrollers who were employees of the Commis-
sion behaved as if they had abdicated their responsi-
bilities to Council Chairmen.” He decried what he 
called the direct involvement of some of them with 
local council officials, adding that in some instances, 
Council Chairmen spoke to the press as if they were 
the people conducting the exercise and not the NPC 
(Meya, 2006: 8).
This situation had ramifications for reports of 
shortages of census materials at the local govern-
ment levels. These “shortages” occurred despite the 
distribution of materials according to the most elab-
orate plans by NPC Headquarters.
Logistic “shortages” of census materials
Sufficient forms were supplied for the Census exer-
cise. Initially, 25 million NPC01 main questionnaires 
were estimated for the Census in the Strategy docu-
ment (NPC, 2004). This was increased to 35.382 
million forms by the Chief Technical Adviser. It was 
finally increased by another 5 percent (1.354 million 
NPC01 forms) to 36.737 million to make allowance 
for a central reserve to cater for emergency short-
ages. By 12 March 2006, 95 percent of the question-
naires had been delivered to the State offices of the 
NPC. Given the significant challenges that arose in 
the course of procurement, the timely delivery of 
the questionnaires was commendable. Bags and 
other Census materials arrived at state offices after 
Census activities had already started. There was no 
information on what precisely caused the delays. 
By 22 March 2006, the third full day of field 
operations, some NPC State offices and State Gov-
ernors started asking for additional NPC01 forms. 
According to NPC headquarters, this meant that 
either the State had completed all NPC01 forms 
provided within the period (an improbable achieve-
ment) or the alarm was being raised with a view to 
collecting more forms than required in the event 
they needed more. In Kebbi and many other States, 
artificial shortages were created by political leaders 
who “pressurized” Comptrollers and State Direc-
tors to provide their constituencies with more forms 
than was planned, leaving less forms for others. 
States reacted to the scarcity of forms in various 
ways. In Nasarawa State, 1,000 NPC01 and 400 
NPC07 forms were photocopied and distributed, 
and the Federal Commissioner was ready to make 
more copies if no new consignment of the forms 
was delivered. Massive photocopying of Census 
forms was also being done in FCT, Kano, Niger and 
Ogun before the Presidential directive asking this to 
stop. In some other states, functionaries used train-
ing versions of questionnaires while waiting for more 
live questionnaires to arrive, while others kept run-
ning between the field and any NPC office for fresh 
materials. In the second half of the Census week, 
four State Governors sent private jets to Abuja to 
personally collect Census forms from NPC Head-
quarters to palliate the reported shortage in their 
States. They returned with boxes of forms, albeit 
much less than they requested. The time that Cen-
sus functionaries spent on travelling to State Offices 
for supplies or making contingency decisions and 
implementing alternative interventions (such as mak-
ing photocopies) impacted on the efficiency of the 
Census operation. 
A substantial part of the irregularities observed 
in the distribution of materials occurred at the level 
of the LGA offices. The well-articulated distribution 
plan for Census forms and materials sent to all Fed-
eral Commissioners, State Directors and LGA 
Comptrollers on 4 March 2006, collapsed at the 
LGA levels in all States13, partly due to pressure on 
the Comptroller from local authorities.14 
In Gombe, Ogun and Plateau States, inappropri-
ate distribution of materials by the LGA Comptrol-
lers was due to inadequate projections of materials 
13.  Guidelines to States and Comptrollers on Distribution of the NPC0s to the Field Census Functionaries by Chairman 
NPC, 4 March 2006.
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needed in the different EAs. Post-fieldwork reports 
suggest that there was an element of hoarding of the 
NPC01, causing artificial shortages on the ground15. 
The phenomenon of hoarding census forms at the 
start of the census could have been borne out of fear 
of not getting a “fair share” of forms and being short-
changed by the census exercise. Unfortunately, it 
would seem that this led to a sufficiently high level of 
shortages in several states of the federation. Three 
weeks after the census enumeration exercise, every 
State (including those which reported major short-
ages) were returning unused NPC01 forms. It was 
estimated at the time that over 1 million forms were 
recovered unused. 
Storekeeping systems
Inadequate storekeeping systems made it impossible 
to track the materials distributed and to predict 
shortages before they occurred. At each administra-
tive level, actual material inflows could have been 
compared with expected material inflows as a kind 
of “early-warning system” on material shortages, giv-
ing the various officials the opportunity to request 
for additional materials before the shortage actually 
occurred. Such a system would also have offered 
management protection against unjustified demands 
from the field for additional materials and helped to 
track any wrongful allocation. Perhaps this would 
have been an excellent means of holding officials 
accountable for any inadequate allocation of materi-
als, thereby ensuring effective management of mate-
rial flows. 
A Comptroller was arrested by police in Benue 
State for allegedly selling NPC01 forms for one mil-
lion Naira. Benue NPC confirmed the theft of 18 
cartons of NPC01 forms at its store in Makurdi 
Council secretariat16. The State office was not able 
to provide the serial numbers of the stolen forms 
but it did recover them after the Census. In the view 
of the NPC Commissioner cross-posted to Enugu 
State, Dr. Suleiman Bello, complaints of shortage of 
materials were a ploy to inflate Census figures17
Against this background, it is instructive to note 
that the Census questionnaire made provision for 
recording a maximum of eight persons. A household 
with more than eight members will require a second 
or third questionnaire. Nigerian survey data indicate 
that only about 5 percent of households have exactly 
eight members. However, results of the pre-test 
conducted in 2005 indicated an over-representation 
of “maximum-line” 8-member households in at least 
22 of the 37 States. Analysis of the Trial Census data 
showed the same tendency with an average house-
hold size of 6.2 members instead of 5.1 from com-
parative survey data. Samples of the 2006 Census 
data were examined at the Data Processing Centres 
and instead of the expected 5 percent, 8-member 
households constituted up to 67 percent of house-
holds in Katsina State and 100 percent of households 
in some EAs in Ogun State. This phenomenon of 8 
person households (or Maximum Line Households, 
MLHs) has always been known to demographers at 
NPC and they have developed a methodology for 
addressing it. Nevertheless, the fact that it appears 
only in Nigerian census and not in survey data 
reflects how the Nigerian census produces some 
systematic data errors.
Conclusion
Much of the discussions and observations contained 
in this paper were the result of the authors’ partici-
pation in an EU external monitoring mission of Cen-
sus 2006. One of us did so for 36 months. We were 
on ground to observe the safe retrieval of 36 million 
questionnaires of the 2006 Nigeria Population and 
Housing Census from the field for data processing. 
We conclude that, like other Censuses since Inde-
pendence, motivations for over-count in the 2006 
Census – political representation and revenue alloca-
tion – were strong and institutional controls were 
often subverted by exigencies encountered by cen-
sus functionaries in the field and this might have 
undermined data quality. There were, in addition to 
motivation, opportunities for manipulation of figures 
despite attempts by NPC to control this through 
cross-posting of key functionaries. These efforts did 
not always have the intended effects because of the 
poor timing of the cross-posting and inadequate 
planning and resource allocation. 
The Comptroller was closest to the LGA author-
ities and, owing to inadequate resource allocation, 
was easily the weakest link in the Census 2006 proc-
ess from Enumeration Area Demarcation, through 
recruitment of functionaries, distribution of field 
14.  Beyond these guidelines on NPC 01s, there were guidelines governing the distribution of all census materials other than 
the forms. Also, in the states, Senior Officers from the headquarters and resource persons from Universities were 
assigned the responsibility of distribution. In several instances, there were reports sent to the Headquarters of the officers 
refusing to accede to the demands for additional forms from LGA Comptrollers or influential locals where they felt the 
requests were not justified
15.  Preliminary Report on the Returned Unused Blanc Census forms, NPC01 from the States, by Chairman NPC, 24 April 
2006.
16.  ThisDay, 27 March, 2006.
17.  Vanguard, 27 March, 2006.
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forms to the actual enumeration itself. It is at the 
comptroller level that subsequent censuses should 
focus strong inter-agency and global partnership col-
laborations. NPC Comptrollers were at the heart of 
the distribution and retrieval process at the LGA 
level. They were vulnerable to political pressure 
from local politicians at every stage of census activity.
The 1991 census is the most recent census con-
ducted by a non-political, “technical” board. It 
employed that period’s state of the art methodolo-
gies and technologies; it was assisted by renowned 
demographers, cartographers and IT specialists and 
had adequate financial resources from the govern-
ment of the day. The results of the census were 
adjudged by neutral commentators and demogra-
phers, including one of the authors18 as being fairly 
accurate. It is clear that a nonprofessional board con-
sisting of political appointees of the ruling party does 
not provide assurances of political neutrality. The 
constitutional changes needed to transform the NPC 
Board into a smaller, more technical, and effective 
group is an area that will reveal the strength of 
Nigeria’s political will in having scientific censuses. It 
will also be the context in which public understand-
ing of the nature and uses of the censuses can be dis-
cerned. Without institutional and constitutional 
changes of this kind, the perceived connections 
between population size, on the one hand, and reve-
nue allocation/political representation, on the other, 
will leave all future Nigerian censuses prone to polit-
ical influence regardless of how technically sound 
their design may be.
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